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Abstract 
The paper discusses a laboratory experiment in which pairs of trustors play 
finitely repeated Trust Games with the same trustee. We study trustfulness of 
the trustors as well as trustworthiness of the trustee. We distinguish between 
learning and control effects on trustfulness and trustworthiness. Learning ef-
fects are related to an actor’s information on past behavior of the partner. Con-
trol effects are related to opportunities for sanctioning a trustee in future inter-
actions. The experiment includes two conditions that represent different types 
of “embeddedness” of Trust Games. In one condition, each trustor only knows 
what happens in her own games with the trustee. In the other condition, each 
trustor also knows what happens in the games of another trustor with the trus-
tee. Thus, with respect to trustfulness of the trustor, the design allows for disen-
tangling learning effects from own experience of the trustor with the trustee and 
learning effects through third-party information, i.e., information on experi-
ences of the other trustor with the trustee. Also, the design allows for disentan-
gling control effects on trustfulness and on trustworthiness through own sanc-
tion opportunities of the trustor and through opportunities for third-party 
sanctions, i.e., sanctions implemented by the other trustor. 
1   Introduction 
Social and economic exchange often presupposes trust between actors. When lending 
a book to a colleague, we trust the colleague to return the book in good shape. A 
buyer of a second-hand car trusts the dealer to be honest about hidden defects of the 
car. We may be more inclined to trust a colleague who has often returned our books in 
good shape in the past. The more information you have from your friends on their 
good experiences with a second-hand car dealer, the more you may be inclined to buy 
a car yourself from the dealer unless, maybe, you happen to know that the dealer is 
about to retire and close down his outlet. These examples illustrate the intuition that 
trustfulness may be fostered by positive information about trustworthiness of the trus-
tee in the past. The last example illustrates that trustfulness and trustworthiness might 
become problematic when opportunities for future sanctioning of the trustee’s present 
behavior become infeasible. 
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Our examples are related to the “embeddedness” of trust problems and exchange in 
the sense of [17]. Embeddedness refers to repeated transactions over time between the 
same partners and to transactions between partners who share a network with third 
parties. In [7], Buskens and Raub distinguish two mechanisms through which em-
beddedness affects trust1: learning and control. On the one hand, actors can learn that 
a trustee has been trustworthy in the past and may infer from this that the trustee is 
likely to be trustworthy now as well. On the other hand, actors can base trust on sanc-
tion opportunities in the future. The more extensive future sanctions can be, the more 
likely that the trustee realizes that his short-term incentives from abusing trust do not 
compensate for the long-term losses he will incur due to the sanctions of the trustor. 
Consequently, the more extensive the sanction opportunities of the trustor, the more 
likely it is that the trustor can trust the trustee because it is more likely that the trustee 
will be trustworthy. Buskens and Raub also distinguish between two levels of em-
beddedness: the level of the dyad and the network level. They argue that learning and 
control operate at both of these levels (see also [27, pp 138-139] for a similar discus-
sion of learning and control through network embeddedness). Trustors can learn 
through own experiences and through experiences of others. Sanctions can be exe-
cuted by the trustor herself or by third parties such as other trustors of the trustee. 
Learning and control effects on trust through dyadic and network embeddedness 
are intimately connected to reputation effects on trust. Roughly (see, e.g., [22, pp. 
629-633] for an extensive discussion), the reputation of an actor is a characteristic or 
an attribute that partners ascribe to the actor. The empirical basis of an actor’s reputa-
tion is his observed past behavior. Thus, the trustee’s present reputation for trustwor-
thiness ascribed to him by a given trustor depends on the trustor’s own prior experi-
ences with the trustee as well as on third-party information on the trustee that the 
trustor receives from other trustors. The trustee’s present reputation for trustworthi-
ness thus depends on dyadic learning as well as on network learning of the trustor and 
will affect the trustor’s trustfulness. In addition, the trustee’s present trustworthiness 
will affect his future reputation for trustworthiness vis-à-vis the trustor with whom the 
trustee interacts today as well as vis-à-vis other trustors who receive information on 
the trustee’s present behavior. Reputation effects on trust can thus be conceived as 
learning and control effects on trust through dyadic and network embeddedness. 
Experimental as well as survey research provides evidence for effects of em-
beddedness on trust (see [8] for an overview). The problem with most of the evidence 
is that effects of learning and control are hard, if at all, to disentangle. Therefore, how 
embeddedness affects trust is a largely unresolved question. This paper provides new 
evidence on learning and control effects on trust through dyadic embeddedness and 
network embeddedness from a laboratory experiment in which subjects have to make 
incentive-guided choices. The experiment complements earlier research in four ways. 
First, learning and control mechanisms can be clearly disentangled. Second, the de-
sign of the experiment ensures that embeddedness characteristics are exogenously 
given rather than being themselves results of individual choices. This facilitates the 
interpretation of empirical findings on embeddedness effects. Third, subjects are pre-
                                                          
1 The noun “trust” is used as shorthand for “trustfulness and trustworthiness.” Only when used 
as a verb or in conjugations such as “abuse trust” and “honor trust,” trust refers exclusively to 
“trustfulness.” 
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cisely and truthfully informed on the incentive structure and their payments depend 
on their own and others’ choices. While the external validity of experimental designs 
remains questionable in principle, the assumption of external validity becomes plausi-
ble to a considerable extent when results that have been found employing other re-
search designs such as surveys are replicated in this experiment. Finally, we analyze 
effects of embeddedness through learning and control not only on trustfulness of the 
trustor but also on trustworthiness of the trustee. 
2   Embedded Trust: Hypotheses 
We define a trust situation as an interaction with strategic interdependence between 
two actors, the trustor and the trustee. If the trustor trusts the trustee, the trustee has 
the possibility and an incentive to act opportunistically, i.e., to abuse trust. Compared 
to the situation when she does not trust the trustee, the trustor regrets being trustful if 
trust is abused but she is better off after trusting the trustee if the trustee does not be-
have opportunistically. A trust situation can be represented as the well-known Trust 
Game shown in Figure 1. The Trust Game is a game-theoretic representation of a trust 
situation [11, 12, 13, 20]. The Trust Game starts with a move by the trustor, who trust 
(i.e., she is “trustful”) or does not trust. If the trustor does not trust, the game is over, 
with trustor and trustee each obtaining a payoff P. If the trustor trusts, the trustee 
chooses between honoring trust (i.e., he is “trustworthy”) and abusing trust. If the 
trustee honors trust, trustor and trustee each receive R > P. If the trustee abuses trust, 
the trustor receives S < P, while the trustee receives T > R. 
In our experiment, Trust Games are played in triads comprising two trustors and a 
trustee. Clearly, a triad represents a small network between the actors. First, one of 
the trustors, say, trustor 1, plays a Trust Game with the trustee. After this Trust Game 
has been finished, the other trustor, trustor 2, plays a Trust Game with the same trus-
tee. This pair of two games is played 15 times. All actors, trustors and trustee, have 





























Fig. 1. Extensive form of a Trust Game. T > R > P > S. The right-hand Trust Game is 
the numerical example used in the experiment 
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rounds to be played, each actor’s payoff function, etc. The experiment employs two 
information conditions and actors know in which information condition they are: 
 
1. No information exchange between trustors: each trustor only knows what happens 
in her own Trust Games with the trustee but is not informed about what happens in 
the games of the other trustor playing with the same trustee. 
2. Full information exchange between trustors: after each Trust Game, also the trustor 
not involved in that game receives information on the choices made in that game. 
 
Assume now that subjects differ in the way they value outcomes because of their so-
cial orientations [24, 26] or preferences for fairness or reciprocity [3, 14, 21]. This 
means that actors’ utilities may differ from their own material payoffs. Also, while 
knowing their own utility function, actors may be incompletely informed on the util-
ity functions of other actors. Thus, our basis for learning is the trustors’ uncertainty 
about trustees’ utility from the payoffs in the games and the possibility that these utili-
ties might be such that some trustees do not have an incentive to abuse trust. A de-
tailed discussion of theoretical models that include such assumptions is beyond the 
scope of this paper (see, e.g., [6, 11, 13]). However, it is intuitively clear that trustors 
might now believe that some trustees will not abuse trust. If trustors have doubts 
about the behavior of at least some trustees, this can have consequences even for 
those trustees who do have an incentive to abuse trust. Namely, such trustees can 
profit from appearing trustworthy in early rounds of a finitely repeated Trust Game 
and can thus have an incentive for reputation building, while they will abuse trust to-
wards the end of the game. 
We can now derive hypotheses on learning effects through embeddedness on trust-
fulness of trustors from various backward looking learning models (see [10, 16] for 
overviews of such models). They typically imply (see [9] for details) that trustfulness 
is more likely if trust has been honored more frequently and also, accounting for dis-
counting of past experiences, more recently. On the other hand, trustfulness will be-
come less likely after trust has been abused. The behavior of the trustee is expected to 
be largely determined by his concern to build and keep up a good reputation and, 
therefore, is expected to be mainly driven by control effects. We thus test the follow-
ing two hypotheses on learning effects on trustor behavior: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (dyadic learning): The more a trustor’s trustfulness has been honored 
in the past, the more likely it is that this trustor is trustful; the more a trustor’s trust-
fulness has been abused in the past, the less likely it is that this trustor is trustful. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (network learning): The more information a trustor has that trustful-
ness of another trustor has been honored in the past, the more likely it is that she will 
be trustful herself; the more information a trustor has that trustfulness of another trus-
tor has been abused in the past, the less likely it is that she will be trustful herself. 
 
In addition to learning effects and in line with arguments on incentives for reputation 
building for the trustee, we can derive hypotheses on control effects. The theoretical 
basis for these hypotheses are models for games with incomplete information [19] 
that assume rational forward looking behavior with learning in the sense of Bayesian 
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updating of beliefs (see [4, 6, 11, 13] for applications of such models to finitely re-
peated Trust Games). The basic intuition is that a trustee will be more likely to be 
trustworthy and, therefore, the trustor more likely to be trustful, the more the trustee 
has to lose in future games after he would abuse trust. The losses come from trustors 
not being trustful anymore because they experienced abused trust themselves or hear 
about it from another trustor. Trustor 2 can profit less from this network information 
at the end of the game because there is one game less to be played after her game 
compared to the trustor 1’s game in the same round. This leads to the following hy-
potheses on control effects on trust and trustworthiness (see [9] for details): 
 
Hypothesis 3 (dyadic control – trustor): The more rounds left in the game, the 
higher the likelihood that a trustor is trustful; the likelihood of trustfulness decreases 
faster in the last few rounds of the game than in earlier rounds (end-game effect). 
 
Hypothesis 4 (network control – trustor): In the condition with full information ex-
change between trustors, compared to the condition with no information exchange, 
the likelihood of trustfulness is higher and will decrease less in early rounds. The end-
game effects will be stronger for trustor 2 than for trustor 1. 
 
Hypothesis 5 (dyadic control – trustee): The more rounds left in the game, the 
higher the likelihood that trust will be honored; the likelihood of trustworthiness de-
creases faster in the last few rounds of the game than in earlier rounds (end-game ef-
fect). 
 
Hypothesis 6 (network control – trustee): In the condition with full information ex-
change between trustors, compared to the condition with no information exchange, 
the likelihood of trustworthiness is higher and will decrease less in early rounds. The 
end-game effect will be stronger in games with trustor 2 than in games with trustor 1. 
3   The Experiment 
In the experiment, the outcomes of the Trust Games are points that subjects earn. If 
the trustor is not trustful, this yields 10 points for both trustor and trustee; when trust 
is honored, each actor receives 20 points; when trust is abused, the trustee receives 40 
points, leaving the trustor with no points (see the right-hand Trust Game in Figure 1). 
Subjects are paid 1 eurocent for each point they earn at the end of the experiment. 
The experiment was programmed using z-Tree software [15]. Subjects play the 
Trust Game in supergames of 15 rounds. Subjects are matched in groups of three, one 
trustee and two trustors, which we call triads. In each of the 15 rounds, the trustee 
plays one Trust Game with each of the two trustors. During the 15 rounds, the trustee 
plays with the same two trustors in each round. Therefore, in every round, while trus-
tors play one Trust Game, the trustee plays two Trust Games, adding to 30 Trust 
Games played per supergame by one trustee. The trustee not necessarily needs to 
make a choice in all 30 games: when the trustor does not trust, the trustee has no 
choice to make. 
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In every round, the trustee always plays with the same trustor first, while the other 
trustor has to wait, and always plays second with this trustee. Thus, within a super-
game, the trustors always move in the same order. The trustors are referred to as trus-
tor 1 and trustor 2, respectively. 
As already mentioned, there are two conditions in the experiment. In both condi-
tions, the trustee is immediately informed on the trustor’s move in the current Trust 
Game. Between conditions the amount of information is varied that is shared among 
the two trustors playing with the same trustee. In the “no information exchange be-
tween trustors” condition, trustors do not share any information. In the “full informa-
tion exchange between trustors” condition, trustors playing with the same trustee do 
share all information about each other’s games. In this condition, as soon as a game 
has been played, either the first or the second game in the round, also the other trustor 
receives information on the choices made in this game. Information is provided auto-
matically by the computer and is always truthful. All subjects know in what informa-
tion condition they are and thus also know what information is available to the other 
two actors in their triad. All subjects see the outcomes of the games they played them-
selves in previous rounds on their screens. In the condition with full information ex-
change, each trustor also sees the outcomes of the previous Trust Games of the other 
trustor on the screen. Note that the experimental design ensures that embeddedness is 
exogenous and is not itself a result of subjects’ choices. 
Every subject played three times a supergame as described above, once as a trus-
tee, once as trustor 1, and once as trustor 2. Each subject played all three supergames 
in the same information condition. In between the three supergames, the subjects were 
rematched to other subjects. Subjects were never rematched to other subjects they al-
ready played with in a previous supergame. This was made common knowledge to all 
subjects. 
The experiment was conducted in the ELSE laboratory of Utrecht University, in a 
computer room specially designed for experiments: every subject was seated behind a 
PC in his or her own cubicle, with a separate cubicle for the experimenters. Each ses-
sion comprised 18 subjects. When all 18 subjects were present, instructions on paper 
were provided and the treatment was started. Within a session, the instructions were 
the same for everyone and this was also made common knowledge to the subjects. 
Subjects were explained how the game worked they were about to play, and that they 
would receive 1 eurocent for every point they earned. 
After reading the instructions, a few questions were asked on the computer screen 
so that subjects could check whether they understood the instructions. In case of in-
correct answers, subjects were provided the correct answers and a brief explanation. 
Subjects also played two practice rounds in which they could not earn any points yet. 
These rounds were not played with other subjects, but with the computer to guarantee 
standardized moves of the “partners” in these rounds. 
Then the three supergames were played. At the end of the experiment, subjects had 
to fill in a short questionnaire, including items concerning their general trustfulness 
and trustworthiness. Meanwhile, the experimenters prepared closed envelopes with 
the earnings for each subject. The sessions took between 55 and 70 minutes. Subjects 
earned on average €10.67, with an average of €11.10 for subjects in the condition 
with full information exchange and €10.25 for those in the no information exchange 
condition. The minimum and maximum earnings were €7 and €12.40.  
Embedded Trust: An Experiment on Learning and Control Effects      7 
The information about the structure of the experiment such as the number of 
rounds, roles (i.e., being trustor or trustee), and what subjects would get to know was 
honestly provided and subjects were never deceived or in another situation than told. 
In order to prevent inducing normative associations, the names of the different roles 
and their possible moves were rendered neutrally. For instance, the moves of the trus-
tee were labeled “down” and “right” rather than “honor trust” and “abuse trust.” 
In total, 72 subjects participated in the experiment, 28 male and 44 female, mostly 
undergraduate students from different fields, most of them students of social sciences. 
Subjects were recruited using the online recruitment system ORSEE [18]. Four ses-
sions were scheduled and 18 subjects participated in each session. Two sessions were 
played in the condition with no information exchange between trustors and two ses-
sions in the condition with full information exchange. 
4   Data and Statistical Model 
The experiment comprised four sessions, with six triads per session and three super-
games of fifteen rounds per subject, each round comprising two Trust Games. Thus, 
4×6×3×15×2 = 2160 Trust Games were played in total. Note that trustee behavior is 
observed only in those games in which the trustor is not trustful. There are 485 games 
in which there was no trust, leaving 1675 games (78% of the total number of games 
played) in which the trustee’s behavior is observed. Trustors are more trustful in the 
full information exchange condition (in 913 of the 1080 games) than in the no infor-
mation exchange condition (in 762 of the 1080 games) and trustfulness decreases over 
rounds. Also, trustworthiness decreases over the rounds. These descriptive findings 
are in line with our hypotheses. Figure 2 displays the descriptives graphically. 
The descriptives are in line with earlier experiments (see [8, 10, pp. 446-453] for 
overviews). Trustfulness and trustworthiness are high for most of the rounds, with 
strong end-game effects in the last couple of rounds. We observe that repeating the 
Trust Game with the same partner, i.e., dyadic embeddedness (also known as “partner 
matching” in the experimental literature), and the availability of third-party informa-
tion, i.e., network embeddedness, have complementary effects. This could not be con-
cluded from otherwise closely related earlier experiments [2]. Summarizing, the de-
scriptive analyses show that dyadic embeddedness leads to rather high levels of 
trustfulness and trustworthiness, higher than is normally found in one-shot Trust 
Games, including series of one-shot Trust Games, each played with a different partner 
(also known as “stranger matching” in the experimental literature). Still, additionally 
providing information about Trust Games of the trustee with another trustor induces 
even more trustfulness and trustworthiness. 
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Fig. 2. Proportion of games in which trust was trustful (left) and trust was honored (right), per 
round, and per experimental condition. 
Our dependent variables identify the behavior of the trustor and the trustee. Vari-
ous independent variables represent past experiences. First, for each round t, we con-













We define PASTHONOR_OWN = 0 for the first round of a supergame. Similarly, we de-













Note that ABUSE_OWN and HONOR_OWN can be equal to 0 simultaneously, namely, 
when the trustor is not trustful. Therefore, the effects of the two variables just defined 
should be interpreted relative to the number of times the trustor was not trustful. The 
parameter w1 is estimated in the statistical model. We assume that w1 is the same for 
honored trust and for abused trust in the past. 
In the condition with full information exchange, each trustor also receives informa-
tion about the games of the other trustor. To complete the set of independent variables 
needed for testing hypotheses on learning effects for the trustor, we thus define vari-














Information from the other trustor might be forgotten or discarded faster than own ex-
periences. Therefore, we introduce the parameter w2. The variables 
PASTHONOR_OTHER and PASTABUSE_OTHER are always set to 0 in the condition with-
out information exchange between trustors. 
The variables representing control effects are straightforward. FUTURE is the num-
ber of rounds left. FUTUREFULL represents network control. This variable is the inter-
Embedded Trust: An Experiment on Learning and Control Effects      9 
action of FUTURE with a dummy for whether subjects are in the condition with full in-
formation exchange between trustors. In addition, we use dummies that indicate the 
last but one and the last round of the repeated game: ROUND14, ROUND15. These vari-
ables are again interacted with dummies for the information condition: 
ROUND14FULL, ROUND15FULL. We also distinguish between the games with trustor 1 
and with trustor 2 in the last two rounds for the information condition. Therefore, two 
dummies are used for the games with trustor 2 in the full information condition in 
these two rounds: ROUND14TR2FULL, ROUND15TR2FULL. 
The statistical model used to analyze the data is a three-level logistic regression 
model. Based on the difference in attractiveness between the two possible moves of 
the trustor and assuming that there is some randomness in the extent that we know the 
attractiveness, we can estimate a logistic regression model for the probability that 
trustor j in triad i is trustful at time t: 
1 2 3 4
1 2 3 4
(own learning) (TP-learning) (own control) (TP-control)








β ⋅ +β ⋅ +β +β + + +ε
β ⋅ +β ⋅ +β +β + + +ε= +  
(4) 
where the β’s indicate the vectors of regression coefficients for the respective groups 
of independent variables, namely, variables representing own learning, learning 
through third-party information, own control opportunities, and control opportunities 
involving third parties. Furthermore, ui is a random component for the triad in which 
the decision is made, vij is a random component for the trustor within the triad who 
makes the decision, and εijt is the random component for each individual decision. 
This is a hierarchical three-level model (see, e.g., [25]). Strictly speaking, we have a 
cross-classified nesting because trustors are involved twice in a series of 15 Trust 
Games with different partners. However, estimating this more complex structure af-
fects the outcomes of the analyses only marginally. Also, the random component re-
lated to trustors has a similar size in this more complex estimation. 
The statistical model for the probability that trustee i in his triad honors trust with 












β +β + + +ε
β +β + + +ε= +  
(5) 
where the β’s again represent the regression coefficients; ui is a random component 
for the trustee making the decision. In this case, this is equivalent to the triad in which 
the decision is made; vij is a random component for the trustor in the triad with whom 
the trustee is playing a specific Trust Game; and εijt is the random component for each 
individual decision. Again, the specification of the random components could have 
been more complex, because each trustor is involved in two triads and, therefore, the 
random component for trustors could have been specified as a cross-classified model 
in which the random component represents randomness related to a specific subject 
playing as a trustor. Because random components related to the trustors are consis-
tently estimated to be 0 in the models for explaining trustees’ behavior, we stick to the 
simpler hierarchical model in which we control for nesting of trustees’ decisions 
within trustors. 
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5   Results 
We first analyze trustfulness of trustors. As a baseline model, we report a logistic re-
gression of the likelihood that a trustor is trustful with a dummy (FULL INFORMATION) 
for the experimental condition, a dummy for whether trustor 2 is involved rather than 
trustor 1 (TRUSTOR2), and two dummies for the second and the third supergame 
(TREATMENT2, TREATMENT3) in Table 1. This model shows that there is more trust-
fulness in the condition with full information exchange between trustors than in the 
condition with no information exchange. Trustfulness also increases over the super-
games, as indicated by the significant difference between the first and the third super-
game, while the second supergame is in between. The random parts at the triad and 
trustor level show that about 28% of the variance can be attributed to the triad, while 
Table 1.  Three-level logistic regression of the likelihood for a trustor to be trustful (2160 deci-
sions by 144 trustors in 72 triads).  
  Baseline model Full model 
 Hyp. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. 
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*, ** indicate significance at p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively (two-sided tests). 
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only 5% can be attributed to a specific trustor within a triad. Through separate analy-
ses we found that almost all the variance at the trustor level is due to the no informa-
tion exchange condition, while there is hardly any variance that can be attributed to 
the individual trustors in the full information exchange condition. 
In the full model, the main effect of the full information condition vanishes, indi-
cating that the difference between the experimental conditions is mainly due to the 
learning and/or control variables in the full model. The full model provides clear evi-
dence for Hypothesis 1 on effects of dyadic learning as well as for Hypothesis 2 on 
network learning. Trustors are more trustful after experiencing themselves more hon-
ored trust and they are less trustful after experiencing themselves more abused trust. 
In addition, when they observe that the other trustor’s trustfulness is honored more of-
ten, this also increases their likelihood to be trustful themselves, while their own trust-
fulness decreases if they observe more abused trust of the other trustor in the same 
triad. In addition, it can be seen that the effect of experiencing honored trust in the 
trustor’s own games is larger than the effect of information about honored trust in 
games of the trustee with the other trustor. It is striking that the effect of information 
about abused trust in games of the trustee with the other trustor is almost as large as 
the effect of experiencing abused trust in the trustor’s own games with the trustee. 
The significance of the effect of information about abused trust in games with the 
other trustor is smaller as can be inferred from the larger standard error, but that could 
be due to the fact that there are less data on these experiences because they only occur 
in the condition with full information exchange. 
Considering control effects on trustfulness, we see a clear dyadic control effect of 
the rounds still to be played. Also, the end-game effects are strong, starting in round 
14, while dummies for earlier rounds did not add to the explained variance. These re-
sults provide support for Hypothesis 3. However, there is not much evidence for Hy-
pothesis 4 about of network control effects on trustfulness. The interaction of the 
number of rounds left with the full information exchange condition is not significant, 
indicating that the general decrease of trust is not less strong in the condition with full 
information exchange between trustors. In addition, there is no main effect left of the 
full information condition after controlling for learning, which would indicate a net-
work control effect. The end-game effects are about twice as strong in the full infor-
mation condition as in the condition with no information condition and this difference 
is significant for round 15. These steeper network effects are mainly due to earlier ex-
periences of honored trust in the condition with full information exchange through 
which the level of trustfulness is higher before it starts to decrease. The two additional 
dummies that interact the variables indicating the two final rounds in the full informa-
tion condition with a variable indicating the trustor who is playing are not significant. 
This implies that we also do not find evidence for the second part of Hypothesis 4. As 
we will see below, the trustee does anticipate on the network control opportunities of 
the trustors, which is also the main explanation why trust remains higher in the full in-
formation condition, but the trustors do not seem to anticipate themselves on this an-
ticipation of the trustee. Finally, the controls for the first rounds show that the starting 
level of trust slowly increases over the treatments, indicating that trustors realize more 
and more that trustfulness can be beneficial in the beginning of a supergame. 
We now turn to the analysis of the trustworthiness of trustees. The baseline model 
in Table 2 shows that there is more trustworthiness in the condition with full informa-
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tion exchange between trustors than in the condition without information exchange. 
While trustors develop some more trustfulness over the treatments, it is not the case 
that the trustees’ behavior changes significantly over the treatments. Controlling for 
these treatment variations, we see that no unexplained variance is attributed to the 
trustor level and that 28% of the unexplained variance is attributed to the trustee level. 
The remaining 72% of the unexplained variance is at the decision level. 
The full model provides the results of the tests of the hypotheses on trustworthi-
ness. Notice that the difference between the two experimental conditions is not ex-
plained away by the hypothesized effects for the trustee. With respect to control ef-
fects on the likelihood of trustworthiness, the effect of dyadic embeddedness 
(FUTURE) is strongly significant. However, the interaction term with the full informa-
tion condition (though non-significant) shows that dyadic control is only present in 
the condition without information exchange between trustors. Apparently, control is 
so strong in the condition with information exchange (which is also indicated by the 
remaining main effect of full information) that the likelihood of trustworthiness re-
mains at or even above the 90%-level throughout the first thirteen rounds of a super-
game. The fact that the main effect of full information is positive and that trustworthi-
ness does not decrease in the first 13 rounds in the full information condition thus 
indicates that there is an additional control effect of network embeddedness over and 
above dyadic control. After round 13, there is a clear drop in the likelihood of trust-
worthiness in both information conditions. When we study these end-game effects in 
Table 2. Three-level logistic regression of the likelihood to honor trust (1542 decisions with 
144 trustors by 72 trustees in 72 triads).  
  Baseline model Full model 
 Hyp. Coeff. Std. err. Coeff. Std. err. 
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*, ** indicate significance at p < 0.05 and p < 0.01, respectively (two-sided tests). 
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more detail, we see that the trustee is much less trustworthy with trustor 2 in the full 
information condition than with trustor 1. This indicates an additional network control 
effect, because trustor 2, compared to trustor 1, has less (or no) control opportunities 
especially in these last two rounds. Summarizing, these results provide quite some 
support for Hypothesis 5 as well as for Hypothesis 6. 
6   Conclusion and Discussion 
In this paper, we have discussed an experiment in which pairs of trustors play Trust 
Games with the same trustee. This is the simplest set-up for simultaneously studying 
effects of dyadic embeddedness and network embeddedness on trust. We distin-
guished between learning and control effects of embeddedness. We have analyzed 
how both trustfulness and trustworthiness are affected by embeddedness. 
Learning effects at the dyadic and the network level are both strong determinants 
of trustfulness of trustors. We also find dyadic control effects on trustfulness, but we 
do not find evidence for network control effects on trustfulness. The higher levels of 
trustfulness under network embeddedness are actually caused by the trustees antici-
pating on the stronger sanction opportunities of the trustors. The trustees are more 
trustworthy under network embeddedness, which has the consequence that the trustors 
have more positive learning experiences leading to more trustfulness. The effects on 
trustfulness are very consistent with earlier findings [7, 8]. For trustees, we find dy-
adic control effects as well as network control effects on trustworthiness. 
We conclude by briefly returning to our findings that network control opportunities 
affect trustee behavior while there is evidence for dyadic control effects on trustor be-
havior but no evidence for network control effects on trustor behavior. These findings 
nicely correspond to results from survey research on trust problems in buyer-supplier 
relations [1, 5, 23]. This survey research focuses on how embeddedness affects trust-
fulness of buyers in the sense of investing less in costly contractual safeguards that 
mitigate bad performance, including opportunistic behavior, of suppliers such as de-
livery of inferior quality, delivery delays, or bad service. Also, this survey research 
focuses on how embeddedness affects supplier performance itself and thus also sup-
plier trustworthiness. Results indicate that suppliers react to network control opportu-
nities of buyers in the sense that more such control opportunities for buyers are asso-
ciated with better supplier performance [23]. This finding is nicely in line with our 
experimental result that trustworthiness increases with network control opportunities 
of trustors. On the other hand, dyadic control opportunities of buyers do affect their 
investments in costly contractual safeguards [1], but there is hardly any empirical evi-
dence for effects of network control opportunities on buyer behavior [5]. These find-
ings are in line with our experimental results on effects of control opportunities on 
trustor behavior. 
Buskens (see [5, pp. 152-161]) provides various arguments and also some empiri-
cal evidence that the lack of effects of network control opportunities on buyer behav-
ior could be at least partly due to design, data, or measurement problems of the sur-
vey, including problems due to possible endogeneity of network embeddedness 
characteristics and sample selectivity. However, these are no plausible arguments for 
the lack of network control effects on trustor behavior in our experiment. Thus, one 
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might wonder whether the findings for effects of control opportunities through em-
beddedness indicate limits of strategic rationality. First, consider the situation of the 
trustee (or, respectively, the supplier). He has a good reason to react to the trustor’s 
dyadic control opportunities as well as her network control opportunities when he an-
ticipates that his present trustworthiness might affect future trustfulness of the same or 
other trustors. Similarly, the trustor has a good reason to react to her dyadic control 
opportunities when she anticipates that the trustee anticipates on how his present 
trustworthiness will affect this trustor’s own future trustfulness. However, the trustor 
needs to reason “more steps ahead” before having a good reason to react to her net-
work control opportunities. Namely, she has to anticipate that the trustee anticipates 
on how his present trustworthiness will affect future trustfulness of other trustors and 
that other trustors will in fact condition their trustfulness on the trustee’s present 
trustworthiness. It may be less likely that actors reason so many steps ahead, certainly 
in rather unfamiliar settings such as our experiment. Future research could further ex-
plore this conjecture in various ways. For example, if the conjecture is correct, we 
would expect that effects of network control opportunities on trustor behavior are 
more easily found when trustors play repeated Trust Games with information ex-
change between trustors many times and specifically when they are also in the role of 
the trustee in some of those repeated games. 
Finally, note that network embeddedness can and, in our experiment, empirically 
does affect trustfulness of trustors even if the behavior of trustors themselves is not 
directly affected by their network control opportunities. Since trustees react to net-
work control opportunities of trustors, network embeddedness increases trustworthi-
ness. Through learning effects on trustor behavior, network embeddedness then also 
increases trustfulness. 
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